This Article argues that, once key provisions of the ACA come into effect in 2014, the ACA will impose effective taxes on a number of important decisions affecting low- and moderate-income Americans, including:
- The ACA will deter low- and moderate-income taxpayers from accepting jobs with employers that offer affordable health insurance.
- The ACA will discourage many low and moderate-income taxpayers from attempting to increase their household incomes.
- The ACA will penalize many low and moderate-income taxpayers who choose to marry, and will incentivize many low- and moderate-income taxpayers to divorce.
- The ACA will dissuade employers from hiring low and moderate-income taxpayers, and will encourage employers to reduce the salaries paid to some low and moderate-income employees.
- The ACA will prompt employers to shift some low and moderate-income employees from full-time positions to part-time positions.
- The ACA will tempt employers to implement a number of other costly strategies for circumventing the ACA’s employer mandates and penalties.
- The ACA will induce employers to stop offering “affordable” health insurance to at least some low- and moderate-income employees, and, if this occurs to a significant enough degree, the budgetary cost of the ACA may greatly exceed the official projections issued by the Congressional Budget Office.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
Berkeley Prof: ACA Discourages Many from Marrying or Staying Married & from Accepting Jobs Offering 'Affordable' Insurance
This is from David Gamage University of California, Berkeley - Boalt Hall School of Law: